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ESSAY

SELECTING LAW CLERKS
Patricia M. Wald*

I.

"APRIL

Is

THE CRUELLEST MONTH"

April may indeed have been "the cruellest month" 1 this year for
federal judges and their prospective clerks. For a decade now, federal
judges have been trying - largely without success - to conduct a
dignified, collegial, efficient law clerk selection process. Because each
federal judge has only to choose two to three clerks each year, and
there is a large universe of qualified applicants graduating each year
from our law schools, this would not seem an insurmountable task.
And because each federal judge has choice first-year positions to offer
and has no need or ability to dicker on salary or hours or perks, one
would expect the process to go quickly and smoothly. Not so. To the
contrary, the yearly clerk caper has been variously described as a
"frenzied mating ritual, " 2 "madcap decisionmaking, " 3 "positively surreal, the most ludicrous thing I've even been through . . . brilliant,
respected people ... behaving like 6-year olds"4 and a "process ... in
which the law of the jungle reigns and badmouthing, spying and even
poaching among judges is rife." 5
This state of affairs is ironic. In the circuit courts of appeal, for
example, it is not unusual for a judge to receive 300-400 clerk applications, most from top-drawer candidates. Why then the intense competition among judges, the unreasonable short-fuse deadlines for
acceptance, the covert maneuvering by judges and applicants, and the
judiciary's frustrating inability to devise an orderly process that comports with the seriousness of the job and the dignity of the relationship
between judge and clerk?
After eleven years as a judge and a participant in numerous unsuccessful efforts at reform, let me suggest a few reasons for the highly
• Chief Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in THE WASTE LAND AND OTHER POEMS 25, 27 (1971).
2. Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race far Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, N.Y. Times, Mar.
17, 1989, at B4, col. 1.
3. Internal correspondence.
4. Margolick, supra note 2 (quoting a Stanford student).
S. Id.
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charged atmosphere in which clerk searches are conducted. The
judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually dependent
one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair. Unlike
lawyers in law firms or government bureaucracies, the federal judge (I
speak now primarily of an appellate judge) works in small, isolated
chambers with a minimum of work contacts outside. She is totally
dependent on herself, her law clerks, and her staff, for an output of
forty or more published opinions a year and dozens of unpublished,
nonprecedent-setting opinions. Although she may talk to and confer
with other judges and sometimes their clerks in the opinion-writing
process, her work will basically reflect the efforts of her own chambers. If for any reason one of her clerks proves significantly deficient,
she, or the other clerks, must take up the slack; she cannot tum to
other chambers or other court personnel. Although, as our legal journals chronicle, judges on occasion have fired law clerks during the
year, it is a rare occurrence devoutly to be avoided. As a rule, judges
live with their misjudgments. But an excellent versus a mediocre team
of clerks makes a huge difference in the judge's daily life and in her
work product. Indeed, a judge sometimes decides whether to file a
separate opinion or to dissent in a case based - at least in part upon the support she can anticipate from her clerks. Or she may ask
for, or beg off, responsibility for a particular opinion assignment because of the availability or nonavailability of a particular clerk to work
on the case. Judges talk about it being a "good" or "bad" year, not
just in terms of results they have achieved, or in the importance of
matters before the court, but also in terms of teamwork and the dynamics of work within their chambers. Her clerks are basically the
only persons a judge can talk to in depth about a case. Her colleagues
have their own opinions to write; after the initial post-argument case
conference, there is usually little time for extended discussions about
fine points of an opinion they are not writing. The judge to whom the
opinion is assigned is expected to produce a draft for her colleagues to
critique. If she is in doubt, troubled, or just plain frustrated, the clerk
is her wailing wall. Most of us are not Holmes or Cardozo; we are
often unsure of our analyses or even our conclusions. We need to test
ideas before exposing them to the hard probing of colleagues. We
need assurances, but even more important, criticism from knowledgeable persons who are loyal and unambiguously committed to us. We
have, on occasion, to let our guard down, to speculate, to experiment,
to argue, even to make frank and sometimes uncharitable appraisals of
our colleagues' drafts and suggestions. Despite trendy criticism of undue law clerk influence over judges, my view is that our jurisprudence
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is better for the give and take among judges and law clerks than if
judges had to go it alone.
Different judges use clerks differently, some only to exchange
ideas, or to check footnotes, or to research records, others, after discussion, to draft opinions. I am not sure that one method is better or
truer to the ideal of a good judge than the other. The aim in the opinion-writing effort is to produce a cogent, coherent rationale for a majority or a dissenting opinion, and to accommodate that rationale to
existing law, or even, on appropriate occasions, to move existing law
forward. If the clerks' efforts advance that goal and are acceptable to
the responsible judge, I do not see what difference it makes as to whose
words are whose in the opinion. Given the size of records and the
inexorable increase in caseloads, precious few of us can perform without staff support.
So, in the final analysis, although federal judges' income lags by
comparison with their private peers, they have few perks, no chauffeurs or limousines, and minimal expense accounts, they do have access to the "best and brightest" helpers - albeit for only a year at a
time. That is why good clerks are so valuable, and why many judges
find them worth "going to war" for.
But why the fervent competition for a handful of young men and
women when our law schools spawn hundreds of fine young lawyers
every year? Very simply, many judges are not looking just for qualified clerks; they yearn for neophytes who can write like Learned
Hand, hold their own in a discussion with great scholars, possess a
preternatural maturity in judgment and instinct, are ferrets in research, will consistently outperform their peers in other chambers and
who all the while will maintain a respectful, stoic, and cheerful
demeanor.
And, candidly, there is another factor in the calculus of many appellate judges who lead the annual chase. A judge's reputation among
his own colleagues may in part reflect his ability to garner the most
highly-credentialed clerks under his banner so that he can maintain a
reputation as a "feeder" of clerks to the Supreme Court. Correlatively, the stronger an appellate (or a district) judge's reputation for
channeling clerks to the high court, the more attractive he will be to
many understandably ambitious, qualified clerk applicants. Some
judges have long friendships with justices so that their clerks have an
edge simply by virtue of that relationship. Others become feeders because they consistently are able to recruit the law review editors and
top students from prestigious schools; not surprisingly, they want to
keep it that way. Thus, in any year, out of the 400 clerk applications a

Selecting Law Clerks

October 1990]

155

judge may receive, a few dozen will become the focus of the competition; these few will be aggressively courted by judges from coast to
coast. Early identification of these "precious few" is sought and received from old-time friends in the law schools - usually before the
interview season even begins.
Why is the race so much more frenzied for positions within the
federal courts than at pricey law firms or in choice government agencies, or even in the Supreme Court, which manages to hire its clerks
each year with decorum and no evidence of unseemly competition?
Generally, firms and government agencies are hiring a number of new
associates or staff attorneys; a misjudgment as to any one is not terribly costly. And because the Supreme Court has only thirty-seven
clerkships in all, there are top applicants to accommodate every justice
without jostling. I have never heard of an applicant turning down a
justice's offer or even calling another justice for a counteroffer. Each
spot has equal prestige - no comparative shopping is necessary; there
is no higher clerkship to feed into.
In their less-harried moments, lower court judges realize that there
is plenty of talent out there and that the way we pick clerks now is not
a sure indicator of their performance. One of our ablest federal appellate judges commented during the most recent selection process that
"top grades don't necessarily predict who will end up doing the best
job, and the professors don't know either." He is right, and I would
add that the best performing appellate clerks are not always the ones
who go on to the Supreme Court. However, the myth of the superstar
clerk lives on, and like the pied piper continues to lure pursuing
judges.
II.

FAILED EFFORTS

To

REIGN THE BEAST

Until the last decade, it seemed that federal appellate judges were
content to recruit clerks at an easy pace. There were fewer judges, and
fewer clerkships; judges had one, later two clerks; judges' caseloads
were lighter, their dependence on clerks less critical. Because of the
small numbers, a clerkship, though always a valuable career asset, was
not considered as crucial to certain careers in the law, like teaching, as
it apparently is now. I was hired in 1951 as a clerk to Second Circuit
Judge Jerome Frank in May of my third year on the recommendation
of a law school professor who knew us both. No formal letter of application was made, no heavy appendix of sample work attached. The
interview, if such it was, was conducted in the hallway of the law
school where Judge Frank taught a weekly seminar. A few judges still
do it that way or commandeer faculty friends or panels of their ex-
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clerks to pick out the new clerks. But the majority of judges I know
do otherwise: they meticulously weed out applications according to
grades, law review positions, faculty recommendations, writing samples, winnowing the list down to a week or so of interviews (anywhere
from five to fifty); they then make offers, and reoffers if the first choices
do not accept.
In an open market, where there is no prior agreement on when the
selection process may begin or end, the preemptive striker sets the
time frame for those judges who want to compete. Over three decades,
the selection time has crept forward from late in a student's third year
to midway in his second year. Early-bird judges skim off those applicants with the brightest credentials. This clearly bothers not only
other judges but the top clerk candidates themselves who have their
own preference about whom they wish to clerk for. So upon receiving
an early offer from a less-favored judge, the candidate may call his first
choice, apprise her of the offer, and solicit a counteroffer. And the
race is on. Clerk candidates, by the way, are not themselves without
guile; they learn quickly to hedge, to answer some calls earlier than
others, to avoid some calls altogether, and to solicit time in which to
seek competing offers. Judges, in turn, sometimes are unseemly in
their pursuit. They make "short-fuse" offers that lapse if the clerk
does not respond within a specified time. Without any agreed upon
guidelines among judges, the process over the years has peaked earlier
and earlier and become ever more frenzied.
For almost a decade now, judges have complained that the clerkship selection process is undignified, even demeaning. Law school
deans and faculties have echoed the lament: students' concentration
on studies is disrupted mid-term; faculties are thrown into internal
competition and forced to make evaluations on inadequate academic
records. Since the early 1980s there have been sporadic attempts to
establish ground rules. The Judicial Conference of the United States
established an ad hoc committee in 1982 that recommended a schedule
for beginning interviews in September of the candidates' third year but
set no fixed, enforceable time within which to make offers. Many
judges abided by the recommended guideline but a substantial number
did not. Because of the consequent tensions, the effort was abandoned.
In successive years, judges in several circuits agreed to deadlines on
offers in April or July, but again, many judges were unwilling to accept these constraints.
Throughout the eighties there were, alternatively, open-season
years (judges were free to make an offer at any time) and years in
which many (but not all) judges in many (but not all) circuits agreed
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to hold to a specified deadline. Skepticism and cynicism about the
effectiveness of these efforts grew. Newly appointed Judges expressed
dismay at how ruthlessly the process worked. Veterans said they were
disinclined to join yet another voluntary compact.
During this time the role of the law schools came under fire as
well. "Back-channel" efforts to place favored students were sc01;ed, as
was the failure of law schools to encourage students to hold to voluntary deadlines. Proposals were made - and rejected - that judges
themselves condition their consideration of applications on a student's
pledge not to consider an offer before an agreed-upon date.
Attempts to enlist the support of the Supreme Court in halting the
rush have been unavailing. Not experiencing the same pressures itself,
the Court remains aloof; apparently, the justices consider it a problem
that lower court judges must resolve for themselves.
In 1989, after a particularly scathing article in the New York Times
comparing federal judges to "sheiks looking for luxury cars," sprinkled with references to the annual "mad dash" for clerks, and "judicial decorum left in the dust," 6 a group of judges, including several
circuit chiefs, undertook a campaign to have the Judicial Councils, the
governing bodies for the circuits, adopt deadlines for clerkship offers.
Recognizing that it was unlikely such a directive cqµld be enforced
against an errant judge, it was still hoped that a polity directive from
the Councils would carry more weight than an info~al agreement of
judges. In the spring of 1989, the District of Columbia Judicial Council passed the following Resolution:
Commencing in 1990, the D.C. Circuit Council is committed to the
practice that no job offers, tentative or final, shall be made to law clerk
applicants before May 1st of the applicant's second year.

In some Circuits, the Resolution talked in terms of the "sense" of the
Council; in one, it was reported that a substantial number of judges
was willing to go along but "two or three stridently independent types
are indulging in forensic displays of Article III independence." One
dubious circuit judge called the proposal a "shot in the dark" and suggested that sometimes doing nothing was the best alternative available.
A second complained that smart applicants could confound the system: "A judge is not going to know how many people to call on May
1st." A third prophesied that the plan would fail because there would
always be noncompliance.
In the end, the D.C., Federal, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Eighth, Tenth, and a majority of judges on the Ninth adopted some
6. Id.
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form of limiting resolution. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh declined. There were two variations in the resolutions: some, but not
all, contained a provision that the offers remain open for twenty-four
hours; some made compliance with the May 1st deadline contingent
upon the concurrence of all other circuits; some agreed unilaterally.
Following the adoption of the resolutions, notices were sent out to
all major law schools. The Association of American Law Schools, in
turn, urged its faculty members to withhold letters of endorsement
until April 1 so that interviewing would be limited to the one month
before May 1. The scheme, however, did not (and could not) prohibit
students from contacting judges, and so the flood of requests for interviews actually began in late February and early March to coincide
with law schools' spring breaks. On the notion that applicants paying
their own travel fares should not have to make repeat visits, most
judges began the interviewing process in early to mid-March; the law
schools fell in line and in many circuits the interviews were largely
over by April 1.
There were some early defections among judges in March, but a
relative few. Many of the restive judges of earlier years stayed the
course in 1990. But there was predictable unhappiness with those circuits that had not adopted resolutions, where judges had the field to
themselves. In some cases, complying judges rationalized that, in
meeting the offer of a noncomplying judge, they were not violating the
agreement. In early April, one of the major circuits withdrew, its
judges lamenting that "most large cartels break down" and suggesting
that it may be necessary "simply to let chaos reign." And a committee
of complying judges in one circuit declared that it was "within the
spirit of the rule" for judges' law clerks to contact students on their
judges' "short lists" to indicate continuing interest and to give the students an opportunity to prioritize their choices. After such notification, it would be fair to expect that students would act promptly when
a firm offer was made.
As Mayday approached, complying judges grew increasingly anxious; efforts to get agreement on a twenty-four-hour waiting period for
acceptances failed. One judge pleaded for at least a short period to
allow students to make a phone call or two before committing themselves to a particular clerkship. "They will learn," he said, "that it
makes little difference in the long run which clerkship they choose."
By consensus, a one-hour waiting period was fixed.
Savvy clerk applicants meanwhile played their own hands. They
(or sometimes their sponsoring professors) called chambers in advance
to announce that that particular judge was the first choice. This news
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permitted the judge confidently to make the applicant an offer ifhe did
it promptly at 12:00 EST (the agreed-upon hour for opening offers); if
he waited, however, he was likely to receive a call that the applicant
had another offer and could only hold out for a few minutes. So, without violating the agreement and making an offer ahead of time, the
judge had only limited control. One venerable judge refused to enter
the May 1 roundup, which he compared to "buying a yearling at an
auction."
What actually happened on May 1? A few judges weakened at the ·
end and made calls ahead of the deadline. This, in turn, provoked the
students to call other judges they preferred before the noon deadline,
so there was a destabilizing flurry of predeadline transactions. But the
major complaint was the frenzy with which offers had to be made and
accepted. Those judges who gave their choices time to reflect found
themselves severely disadvantaged. The one-hour window collapsed
as applicants felt constrained to accept the first offer tendered. A
judge who did not get through to an applicant at 12:00 noon was often
too late. "I got my first choice," one judge complained, "and, after
that, having given the applicant a half hour, I found my next 8 or 9
choices gone." By 12:15 virtually all of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit
was over. Between 12:00 and 12:15, judges were making offers on one
line as calls came in on a second from frantic applicants trying to learn
if they were to get an offer before they responded to the offer of another judge.
Afterwards, a few judges said they thought that postponing the
selection date to May 1 was a gain; some also said the interviewing
process had been more pleasurable and comprehensive since it was not
conducted under the threat of preemptive offers by other judges. A
number of applicants commented favorably that they got to meet and
interview more judges than they might have in other years.
But overwhelmingly, the critics seemed to prevail.7 Judges commonly complained that because all offers were postponed until May
first and interviewing began in March, they interviewed more candidates than they wanted since they could not be sure their first choices
would accept. From their point of view, the time would have been
better spent on the work of the court. And several applicants complained about the increased cost of interviewing with numerous
judges. Given the intense competition for clerkships, most applicants

7. A questionnaire is presently being circulated among federal judges to ascertain more precisely their reactions to last year's experiment.
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felt compelled to interview with many judges; under the old system, an
early offer could save the applicant much of this expense.
Leaders of this year's efforts recognize that it will not likely be
repeated. Some judges who complied have already declared that they
will not do so again. There appear to be three basic options for
change. The first is a return to "complete deregulation." Let those
who wish to compete do so on their own terms, however early they
begin the process or however arbitrarily they act during it. One critic
of this year's experiment points out that judges who are prone to act
entirely at their own discretion will do so no matter what the rules are.
Thus - the deregulators say - the best way is to let judges do what
they want, even if it does not always look decorous to the public.
There is considerable support for this position.
A second option is more regulation: set a definite but shortened
time for interviews immediately preceding the offer deadline, perhaps
April 1-30, and require that the offer remain open for a fixed period,
perhaps one to two hours. But adherents concede that it will not work
unless it can be enforced, and no such control over fiercely independent judges presently exists. A simpler variation has been suggested
and appears to have the greatest support: all circuits agree not to interview until a certain date, preferably in the fall of the students' third
year; once irlterviews begin, offers can be made at any time. Some
West Coast judges, not unreasonably, balk on the ground that it would
give East Coast judges a natural advantage; offers will be made to the
most desirable East Coast candidates before they embark on expensive
interviewing trips West.

III. Is

THERE A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE?

For the past several years, and especially in the months since May
1, judges have talked reverently, if often vaguely, about the "medical
model" - a matching program that has been used for forty years to
match up medical resident applicants with hospital residencies here
and in Canada. 8 In fact, a committee of the D.C. Circuit, headed by
District Judge Louis Oberdorfer, is exploring the feasibility of such a
system for law clerks. The committee has sought the advice of the
Association of Americfill, Law Schools, and firms that design and implement match systems in the medical profession. While recognizing a
8. It has also been used in the Toronto-Vancouver Law Finn Matching Program which
matches law school graduates to firms in those two cities where they must "article" for a year
before becoming eligible for the bar. The program runs under the auspices of the Law Society of
Upper Canada and the Vancouver Bar Association and processes 900 applicants for over 800
positions with approximately 150 employers.
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host of problems, the project participants are moderately optimistic
about the feasibility of such a system for clerk selection.
The basic algorithm for all matching programs is the same,
although software must be customized to address the specific requirements of each program. The system works like this: applicants apply
to any program they are interested in; interviews are conducted completely independently of the match. But no offers can be made during
the specified interview time. By a predetermined date, each applicfil\t
submits a Rank Order List of programs he or she would accept in
order of priority; in the case of law clerks it would be a rank order of
preferences among judges. The judges, in turn, submit similar lists of
their "true preferences." In our case, the matching clearinghouse
would then simulate the making of offers by juqges and the acceptance
or rejection of these offers by applicants based on the information in
the rank sheets. Each judge would receive acceptances from her highest ranked applicants who have not already received offers from judges
that the applicants prefer. A match between an applicant and a judge
would constitute a binding commitment. Following the match, information on positions that remain available would be provided to applicants who had not been matched to a position; correlatively,
information on unmatched applicants would be provided to judges
with unfilled positions. They could then contact and negotiate with
each other at will. All ranking information would be kept
confidential.
Selecting law clerks poses special problems to the· application of a
matching system. First to mind is the need for flexibility to accommodate most judges' personal desires for diversity among their clerks.
Thus, assuming a judge has a clear first preference, she may not have a
clear number two or number three choice regardless of whether
number one accepts. Rather, she may be thinking in terms of a blend
of law schools, gender, race, ethnicity, backgrounds. If she gets her
number one choice, she may know who she wants for number two. If
she gets number two as well, she may have number three picked. But
if she misses on number one, her number two may be altogether different, and even if she gets number one but not number two, her next
choice for number two and for number three may vary. Thus the
ranking of "true preferences" may work for the student applicant but
not for the judge.
In fact, this problem surfaces in medical matches as well. ·Without
getting into the complexities, other programs have found that it is possible to structure the simulated match to accommodate attempts to
recruit a particular distribution based on specific applicant characteris-
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tics. The prospective employer can divide positions into separate categories and submit ranking orders for each type. Thus contingent
rank-ordered preferences would allow judges to submit a different set
of preferences if their first (or second) choices are not available. 9
Whether, however, the subtle factors that enter into a judge's choices
of three clerks can be objectivized sufficiently in advance to be susceptible to simulated choices will remain unknown until a proposed working model is exposed for comment.
One aspect of matching systems - strict confidentiality - could
be attractive to the judiciary. The matchmaker would not disclose
either the judge's or applicant's rank preferences and mutual promises
of "I'll pick you first if you pick me first" would not be enforced. This
confidentiality would protect judges from what they often consider the
embarrassment of having their known first choices prefer other judges.
If they did not disclose their choices voluntarily, they would not be
known. There is no question that collegiality now suffers when a judge
loses his first choice to another judge that the applicant chose or even
solicited in preference to him. The match system is designed to minimize such situations. Of course, it is naive to think that preferences
will not be communicated even if not enforceable. And an applicant
who leads one judge into thinking he is her first choice may well be
quite reluctant to rouse that judge's pique in futuro by downgrading
him on her preference list even if she is given assurances of confidentiality. So even the computerized match may not entirely eliminate preemptive strikes by some judges. But it would certainly soften the
harshness of the Mayday market.
More fundamentally, a judge may feel that a candidate's genuine
desire to clerk for him is a valid element in the judge's own decision.
A highly motivated clerk will often out-produce a less motivated one,
and the relationship with a clerk who truly admires the judge can be
more satisfying than with one who got only her second choice. There
is no great attraction for a judge to list his first five "true preferences"
without knowing whether there is any reciprocal preference. The
judge could end up with the least of both worlds - clerks who were
not his top choices and who did not choose him as theirs.
The match system as presently practiced also means that participating parties are bound by the simulations. That may be too much to
expect of article III judges who are notoriously independent critters. 10
9. The National Matching Service reports that the Vancouver and Toronto programs have
matched 73% of applicants and 76% of law firms to their first or second choices.
10. And perhaps too much patience; after priority lists have been submitted by both sides,
the results of a match typically take 2-1/2 weeks to announce.
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Perhaps the biggest unknown is whether a match system can work
if not all applicants and judges participate. It would not be surprising
to encounter many "wait-and-sees" the first time around, particularly
among judges. One estimate is that it would take participation by at
least seventy percent of the judges on the most aggressive courts and at
least the same percentage of candidates in the principal law schools to
make a match system work.
In existing matching programs, not all applicants or employers
participate, but even the nonparticipants are bound _by some rules.
Thus, in the Toronto-Vancouver apprenticeship match, nonparticipating firms may make offers to participants only up to the time that the
participants submit their rank lists, and they must leave any existing
offers to participating applicants open until that date. Students, in
turn, may accept an offer only up to the date they submit their lists,
not afterwards. If they have accepted an offer, they may not submit a
list. It is not clear - indeed it is quite murky - whether nonparticipating article III judges would agree to abide by any such rules, or
even whether all participating students or judges would stick to them.
In the past, a handful of independent judges have been unwilling to
accept fixed selection dates. Those same judges may defeat a match
system as well, unless other judges are willing to abide by a scheme
that does not have 100% compliance, and hence risks losing a few
superstar applicants. My own feeling is that the match system deserves at least a fair trial as a last hedge against the anarchic open
market so many judges and law schools now deplore. But it is surely
no panacea; it cannot eliminate all of the human variables that beset
the present system. Maybe judges have to look harder into their own
realities and perceptions to see if the gamesmanship at which a few
excel is really worth the angst and perceptions of unseemly competition that now cloud the clerkship selection process. We shall see.

